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Abstract
We address the issue, in cognitive agents, of possi-
ble loss of previous information, which later might
turn out to be correct when new information be-
comes available. To this aim, we propose a frame-
work for changing the agent’s mind without erasing
forever previous information, thus allowing its re-
covery in case the change turns out to be wrong. In
this new framework, a piece of information is rep-
resented as an argument which can be more or less
accepted depending on the trustworthiness of the
agent who proposes it. We adopt possibility theory
to represent uncertainty about the information, and
to model the fact that information sources can be
only partially trusted. The originality of the pro-
posed framework lies in the following two points:
(i) argument reinstatement is mirrored in belief re-
instatement in order to avoid the loss of previous
information; (ii) new incoming information is rep-
resented under the form of arguments and it is asso-
ciated with a plausibility degree depending on the
trustworthiness of the information source.
1 Introduction and related work
In a multiagent environment, belief revision aims at describ-
ing the changes in the agents mind in response to new infor-
mation. On the other hand, one of the important concerns in
argumentation is the strategies employed by an agent in order
to succeed in changing the mind of another agent. To this aim,
the agent must provide good enough reasons to (justify and
then) succeed in such request of change. We can then view
argumentation as an “incitement” to make an agent change its
mind.
Despite the existence of such a clear complementarity be-
tween these two fields of Artificial Intelligence, there are few
works integrating them in a unitary multiagent framework.
However, a consensus exists on the opportunity of integrat-
ing belief revision and argumentation. [Cayrol et al., 2010]
do not integrate belief revision and argumentation, but pro-
pose a work on “revision in argumentation frameworks” in
The third author acknowledges support of the DataLift Project
ANR-10-CORD-09 founded by the French National Research
Agency.
which they transpose the basic issue of revision into argu-
mentation theory. They study the impact of the arrival of a
new argument on the set of extensions of an abstract argu-
mentation framework. [Quignard and Baker, 1997] describe
a model for argumentation in agent interaction that shows
how belief conflicts may be resolved by considering the rela-
tions between the agents’ cognitive states and their choice of
relevant argumentation moves. [Paglieri and Castelfranchi,
2006] claim that belief revision and argumentation can be
seen as, respectively, the cognitive and social sides of the
same epistemic coin and propose a preliminary framework
which follows Toulmin’s layout of argumentation. [Falappa
et al., 2009] survey relevant work combining belief revision
and argumentation. Besides, they develop a conceptual view
on argumentation and belief revision as complementary dis-
ciplines used to explain reasoning. They propose four basic
steps of reasoning in multiagent systems.
 Receiving new information: new information can be rep-
resented as a propositional fact provided with a degree of
plausibility;
 evaluating new information: the origin of new infor-
mation decisively influences the agent’s willingness to
adopt it;
 changing beliefs: the agent uses belief revision tech-
niques to change its epistemic state according to the new
adopted information;
 inference: the agent’s behavior is influenced by the most
plausible beliefs resulting from its new epistemic state.
This paper is not “just” about integrating belief revision
and argumentation in a single framework. It aims at using
the strength resulting from such a combination to solve the
problem of loss of information in the case of reinstatement of
previous information in multiagent systems. More precisely,
we answer the question “in case of such a reinstatement, how
to recover from the loss of previous information which should
become acceptable with new information, and to which extent
old information should be recovered?”
The proposed framework integrates the first three basic
steps considered by Falappa and colleagues. Indeed, in or-
der to represent real situations more faithfully, we consider
that new information is associated with a degree of plausi-
bility which represents the trustworthiness, for the agent, of
the source of information. This is in line with some work in
the literature, like, for example, [da Costa Pereira and Tetta-
manzi, 2010], but the originality, which is the main difference
with the previously cited authors, lies in the fact that a piece
of information is represented as an argument which can be
more or less acceptable. Therefore, such a degree directly
influences the evaluation, performed by an agent, of new in-
formation and, as a consequence, it also influences the extent
to which an agent changes its mind. Based on these consid-
erations, we propose a fuzzy reinstatement algorithm which
provides a satisfactory answer to our research question, which
may be broken down into the following subquestions:
 How to represent arguments and beliefs in this setting?
 How to define a fuzzy evaluation of the arguments?
 How to address the change in the agent’s cognitive state?
The first step is about determining the most suitable rep-
resentation of partially trusted arguments and beliefs. Argu-
ments, of the form h; i, support the agents’ beliefs, which
can be represented as the conclusions of structured argu-
ments. The trustworthiness of a source can be measured by
using probabilities only in the case in which data are avail-
able based on past experiences, for example. In many re-
alistic cases, such data is not available. It is well known that
possibilistic logic is well suited to deal with incomplete infor-
mation. For example, [Amgoud and Prade, 2004] introduce a
unified negotiation framework based on possibilistic logic to
represent the agent’s beliefs, preferences, decision, and revi-
sion under an argumentation point of view. A fuzzy labeling
will then determine the fuzzy set of the agent’s beliefs. [da
Costa Pereira and Tettamanzi, 2010] adopt the representation
of uncertain beliefs proposed in [Dubois and Prade, 1997].
The main point of their proposal may be described as belong-
ing to the fourth among the basic steps proposed by [Falappa
et al., 2009], in the sense that they derive the most useful
goals from the most plausible beliefs and desires. However,
their approach for representing the changes in the agent’s be-
liefs is not argumentation-based and cannot treat reinstate-
ment in a satisfactory way.
The second step is about defining an algorithm which al-
lows a fuzzy evaluation of the arguments. In crisp argumenta-
tion, arguments are evaluated, following a specific semantics,
as acceptable or not acceptable, as shown by [Dung, 1995].
Intuitively, accepted arguments are those arguments which
are not attacked by other accepted arguments and unaccepted
arguments are those attacked by accepted arguments. Given
an accepted argument, its conclusion can be adopted as belief
in the agent’s belief base. To represent the degrees of trust,
we rethink the usual crisp argument evaluation [Dung, 1995;
Caminada, 2006] by evaluating arguments in terms of fuzzy
degrees of acceptability.
The third step is the choice about how to address the
change in the cognitive state of the agent. As observed
by [Dragoni and Giorgini, 1996] and [Delgrande et al., 2006],
for example, the main approaches to belief revision adopt the
principle of the “priority to incoming information” but, in the
context of multiagent systems, this principle presents some
drawbacks. In particular, in a static situation, the chronolog-
ical sequence of arrival of distinct pieces of information has
nothing to do with their trustability or importance. This is
Figure 1: A schematic illustration of the proposed framework.
supported also by [Gabbay et al., 2003], where revision al-
gorithms are presented in order to take into account the his-
tory of previous revisions as well as possible revision options
which were first discarded but may now be pursued. The as-
sumption we put forward in this paper is that, even if the agent
accepts the incoming information throwing away part of the
previously adopted belief base, this change must not be irrev-
ocable. This means that, in the future, new information may
turn the tide in such a way to have the past incoming infor-
mation excluded from the belief-base and the original belief
somehow reintegrated. This is exactly what happens in ar-
gumentation under the name of reinstatement principle. The
difference, which is also one of the original contributions of
this paper, is that the extent of the integration depends on the
agent’s trust in the source. Indeed, we evaluate arguments in
a gradual way depending on such a degree of trust.
A schematic illustration of the proposed framework is visu-
alized in Figure 1. The framework may be regarded as a belief
revision model, based on argumentation. An agent interacts
with the world by receiving arguments A from one or more
sources. The agent’s internal mental state is completely de-
scribed by a fuzzy set of trustful argumentsA, from which the
beliefs of the agent may be derived. A trust module, whose
details are not covered in this paper, assigns a trust degree 
to each source. As new arguments A are received, they are
added to A with the same membership degree as the degree
 to which their source is trusted. Fuzzy labeling of A yields
a fuzzy reinstatement labeling , which may be regarded as
a fuzzy set of acceptable arguments, whose consequences in-
duce a possibility distribution , from which an explicit rep-
resentation B of the agent’s beliefs is constructed as the ne-
cessity measure N of possibility distribution . Notice that
we do not make any further assumptions on the trust model.
This is out of the scope of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the
basic concepts of argumentation theory, Section 3 introduces
the fuzzy evaluation of arguments, Section 4 discusses how
beliefs change with respect to the acceptability degree of the
arguments. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
2 Argumentation theory and labeling
We provide the basic concepts and insights of Dung’s abstract
argumentation [Dung, 1995].
Definition 1 (Abstract argumentation framework) An ab-
stract argumentation framework is a pair hA;!i where A
is a set of elements called arguments and ! A  A is a
binary relation called attack. We say that an argument Ai
attacks an argument Aj if and only if (Ai; Aj) 2!.
[Dung, 1995] presents several acceptability semantics
which produce zero, one, or several sets of accepted argu-
ments. These semantics are grounded on two main concepts,
called conflict-freeness and defence.
Definition 2 (Conflict-free, Defence) Let C  A. A set C
is conflict-free if and only if there exist no Ai; Aj 2 C such
that Ai ! Aj . A set C defends an argument Ai if and only if
for each argument Aj 2 A if Aj attacks Ai then there exists
Ak 2 C such that Ak attacks Aj .
Definition 3 (Acceptability semantics) Let C be a conflict-
free set of arguments, and let D : 2A 7! 2A be a function
such that D(C) = fAjC defends Ag.
 C is admissible if and only if C  D(C).
 C is a complete extension if and only if C = D(C).
 C is a grounded extension if and only if it is the smallest
(w.r.t. set inclusion) complete extension.
 C is a preferred extension if and only if it is a maximal
(w.r.t. set inclusion) complete extension.
 C is a stable extension if and only if it is a preferred
extension that attacks all arguments in A n C.
The concepts of Dung’s semantics are originally stated in
terms of sets of arguments. It is equal to express these con-
cepts using argument labeling. This approach has been pro-
posed firstly by [Jakobovits and Vermeir, 1999] and [Ver-
heij, 2003], and then further developed by [Caminada, 2006]
with the aim of providing quality postulates for dealing with
the reinstatement of arguments. Given that A1 ! A2 and
A2 ! A3, we have that argumentA1 reinstates argumentA3,
i.e., it makes argument A3 accepted by attacking the attacker
of A3. In a reinstatement labeling [Caminada, 2006], an ar-
gument is labeled “in” if all its attackers are labeled “out” and
it is labeled “out” if it has at least an attacker which is labeled
“in”.
Definition 4 (AF-labeling [Caminada, 2006]) Let hA;!i be
an abstract argumentation framework. An AF-labeling is a
total function lab : A ! fin; out; undecg. We define
in(lab) = fAi 2 Ajlab(Ai) = ing, out(lab) = fAi 2
Ajlab(Ai) = outg, undec(lab) = fAi 2 Ajlab(Ai) =
undecg.
Definition 5 (Reinstatement labeling [Caminada, 2006]) Let
lab be an AF-labeling. We say that lab is a reinstatement
labeling iff it satisfies the following:
 8Ai 2 A : (lab(Ai) = out  9Aj 2 A : (Aj !
Ai ^ lab(Aj) = in)) and
 8Ai 2 A : (lab(Ai) = in  8Aj 2 A : (Aj ! Ai 
lab(Aj) = out)) and
 8Ai 2 A : (lab(Ai) = undec  9Aj 2 A : (Aj !
Ai ^ :(lab(Aj) = out)) ^ @Ak 2 A : (Ak ! Ai ^
lab(Ak) = in).
A reinstatement labeling is called illegal if the above condi-
tions do not hold.
A classical propositional language may be used to repre-
sent information for manipulation by a cognitive agent.
Definition 6 (Language) Let Prop be a finite 1 set of atomic
propositions and let L be the propositional language such
thatProp[f>;?g  L, and, 8;  2 L, : 2 L, ^ 2 L,
 _  2 L.
As usual, one may define additional logical connectives
and consider them as useful shorthands for combinations of
connectives of L, e.g.,     : _  .
We will denote by 
 = f0; 1gProp the set of all inter-
pretations on Prop. An interpretation I 2 
 is a function
I : Prop! f0; 1g assigning a truth value pI to every atomic
proposition p 2 Prop and, by extension, a truth value I
to all formulas  2 L. We will denote by [] the set of all
models of , [] = fI : I j= g.
We can give the arguments a structure, and the attack rela-
tion is defined in terms of such a structure of the arguments,
following the example of [Besnard and Hunter, 2001].
Definition 7 An argument is a pair h; i, with  2 L and
  L, such that
1.  0 ?,
2.  ` , and
3.  is minimal w.r.t. set inclusion.
We say that h; i is an argument for . We call  the con-
clusion and  the support of the argument.
The more specific forms of conflict are called undercut and
rebuttal.
Definition 8 (Undercut, Rebuttal) An undercut for an argu-
ment h; i is an argument h	;  i where  = :(1 ^ : : : ^
n) and f1; : : : ; ng  . A rebuttal for an argument
h; i is an argument h	;  i iff  , : is a tautology.
ArgumentAi attacks argumentAj whereAi = h	;  i and
Aj = h; i if either A1 undercuts A2 or A1 rebuts A2.
Throughout the paper, we will make the assumption thatA
is finite. Indeed, if A is the set of arguments that has been
“received” by an agent, it is very reasonable to assume that
the agent, who started operating at some time in the past and
has a finite history, may have received, during its finite life, a
finite number of arguments from finitely many sources.
Another assumption that we make is that an agent never
forgets an argument it has been offered. Therefore, A may
never shrink in time, i.e., if we denote by At the set of argu-
ments received by an agent up to time t,
t1 < t2 ) At1  At2 : (1)
Given an argument A 2 A, we will denote by src(A) the set
of the sources of A.
1Like in [Benferhat and Kaci, 2003], we adopt the restriction to
the finite case in order to use standard definitions of possibilistic
logic. Extensions of possibilistic logic to the infinite case are dis-
cussed for example in [De Baets et al., 1999].
3 Fuzzy Labeling
In order to provide the intuition behind the idea of a fuzzy
labeling of the arguments, consider the following dialogue in
the context of a murder.
Example 1 The judge has to decide whether John has killed
Mary. The agents areWit1 andWit2, two witnesses, a coro-
ner Cor and the judge Jud. Assume the judge completely
trusts the two witnesses but he does not quite trust (lower de-
gree of trust) the coroner because it is well-known that he
is almost always drunk. The judge starts with argument A:
“If John did not kill Mary, then John is innocent” where the
premise is “If John did not kill Mary” and the conclusion
is “John is innocent”. Then, the judge listens to the depo-
sitions of the two witnesses. Wit1 asserts argument B: “I
saw John killing Mary, thus John killed Mary”. Argument B
attacks A’s premise so we have an attack B ! A. Wit2
claims C: “John was at the theater with me when Mary was
killed, thus John did not kill Mary”. Argument C attacks B’s
conclusion and this leads to C ! B. Finally, the judge lis-
tens to the deposition of the coroner who asserts D: “Mary
was killed before 6 p.m., thus when Mary was killed the show
was still to begin”. Argument D attacks C’s premise intro-
ducing an attack D ! C. The attack relation is as follows:
D ! C;C ! B;B ! A.
Example 1 presents a scenario where the arguments cannot
be evaluated from the beginning in the same way because of
the degree of trust assigned to their source. In order to ac-
count for the fact that arguments may originate from sources
that are trusted only to a certain degree, we extend the (crisp)
abstract argumentation structure described in Section 2 by
allowing gradual membership of arguments in the set of ar-
guments A. In other words, A is a fuzzy set of trustful ar-
guments, and A(A), the membership degree of argument A
in A, is given by the trust degree of the most reliable (i.e.,
trusted) source that offers argument A2,
A(A) = max
s2src(A)
s; (2)
where s is the degree to which source s 2 src(A) is trusted.
It must be stressed that the fuzzy contribution in our ap-
proach is different from the one proposed by [Janssen et al.,
2008]. Their fuzzy approach enriches the expressive power of
classical argumentation by allowing to represent the relative
strength of the attack relations between the arguments, while
in our approach the attack relations remains crisp; fuzzyness
is introduced to represent uncertainty due to the fact that in-
formation sources can also be “just” partially trusted.
[Tang et al., 2010] introduce a framework for deci-
sion making where they define trust-extended argumentation
graphs in which each premise, inference rule and conclu-
sion is associated to the trustworthiness degree of the source
proposing it. Thus, given two arguments rebutting each oth-
ers, the argument whose conclusion has an higher trust value
is accepted. The difference is that in such a framework the
2Here, we suppose that the agent is optmistic. To represent the
behaviour of a pessimistic agent, we should use the min operator,
for example.
“labels”, i.e., the trust values, associated to the arguments
never change and the arguments are always accepted with the
same degree even if they are attacked by more trusted argu-
ments.
This fuzzification of A provides a natural way of associat-
ing strengths to arguments, and suggests rethinking the label-
ing of an argumentation framework in terms of fuzzy degrees
of argument acceptability. [Matt and Toni, 2008] define the
strength of the argument the proponent embraces as his long
run expected payoff. The difference with our fuzzy labeling
is that they compute these strengths from probability distri-
butions on the values of a game. The idea in common with
our work is to replace the three-valued labeling with a graded
labeling function.
Definition 9 (Fuzzy AF-labeling) Let hA;!i be an abstract
argumentation framework. A fuzzy AF-labeling is a total
function  : A ! [0; 1].
Such an  may also be regarded as (the membership func-
tion of) the fuzzy set of acceptable arguments: (A) = 0
means the argument is outright unacceptable, (A) = 1
means the argument is fully acceptable, and all cases inbe-
tween are provided for.
Intuitively, the acceptability of an argument should not be
greater than the degree to which the arguments attacking it
are unacceptable:
(A)  1  max
B:B!A
(B): (3)
This is, indeed, a fuzzy reformulation of two basic postulates
for reinstatement proposed by [Caminada, 2006] to charac-
terize the labeling of arguments: (1) an argument must be in
iff all of its attackers are out; (2) an argument must be out iff
there exists an in argument that attacks it.
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to require that
(A)  A(A); (4)
i.e., an argument cannot be more acceptable than the degree
to which its sources are trusted.
By combining the above two postulates, we obtain the fol-
lowing definition.
Definition 10 (Fuzzy Reinstatement Labeling) Let  be a
fuzzy AF-labeling. We say that  is a fuzzy reinstatement la-
beling iff, for all arguments A,
(A) = minfA(A); 1  max
B:B!A
(B)g: (5)
We can verify that the fuzzy reinstatement labeling is a
generalization of the crisp reinstatement labeling of Defin-
ition 5, whose in and out labels are particular cases corre-
sponding, respectively, to (A) = 1 and (A) = 0. What
about the undec label in the fuzzy case? One might argue that
it corresponds to (A) = 0:5; however, an exam of the case
of two arguments attacking each other, A ! B and B ! A,
with A(A) = A(B) = 1, reveals that any fuzzy reinstate-
ment labeling  must satisfy the equation
(A) = 1  (B); (6)
which has infinitely many solutions with (A) 2 [0; 1]. We
can conclude that there are infinitely many degrees of “unde-
cidedness” due to the trustworthiness of the source, of which
0:5 is but the most undecided representative. These degrees
of “undecidedness” express how much the agent tends to ac-
cept those arguments proposed by not fully trusted agents.
Given a fuzzy argumentation framework, how to compute
its fuzzy reinstatement labeling? The answer to this question
amounts to solving a system of n non-linear equations, where
n = ksupp(A)k, i.e., the number of arguments belonging
to some non-zero degree in the fuzzy argumentation frame-
work, of the same form as Equation 5, in n unknown vari-
ables, namely, the labels (A) for all A 2 supp(A). Since
iterative methods are usually the only choice for solving sys-
tems of non-linear equations, we will resort to this technique,
but with an eye to how the labeling is computed in the crisp
case. In particular, we draw some inspiration from [Cami-
nada, 2007]’s idea. We start with an all-in labeling (a labeling
in which every argument is labeled with the degree it belongs
to A). We introduce the notion of illegal labeling for argu-
ment A with respect to Definition 10.
Definition 11 (Illegal labeling) Let  be a fuzzy labeling and
A be an argument. We say that A is illegally labeled iff
(A) 6= minfA(A); 1 maxB:B!A (B)g.
In order to have an admissible labeling, the absence of il-
legally labeled arguments is required. As [Caminada, 2007],
we need a way of changing the illegal label of an argument,
without creating other illegally labeled arguments.
We denote by 0 = A the initial labeling, and by t the
labeling obtained after the tth iteration of the labeling algo-
rithm.
Definition 12 Let t be a fuzzy labeling. An iteration in t
is carried out by computing a new labeling t+1 for all argu-
ments A as follows:
t+1(A) =
1
2
t(A)+
1
2
minfA(A); 1 max
B:B!A
t(B)g: (7)
Note that Equation 7 guarantees that t(A)  A(A) for all
arguments A and for each step of the algorithm.
The above definition actually defines a sequence
ftgt=0;1;::: of labelings.
Theorem 1 The sequence ftgt=0;1;::: defined above con-
verges.
Proof 1 We have to prove that, for all A, there exists a real
number LA 2 [0;A(A)] such that, for all  > 0, there exists
NA such that, for every t > NA, jt(A)  LAj < .
The proof is quite straightforward if one assumes the attack
relation to be acyclic. In that case, the thesis can be proved
by structural induction on the attack relation: the basis is
that if argument A is not attacked by any other argument,
Equation 7 reduces to
t+1(A) =
1
2
t(A) +
1
2
A(A);
and, since 0 = A(A), the sequence is constant and thus
trivially converges to A(A). The inductive step consists of
assuming that ft(B)gt=0;1;::: converges for all arguments
B such that B ! A, and proving that then ft(A)gt=0;1;:::
converges as well. If all ft(B)gt=0;1;::: converge, then so
does ft(A)gt = fminfA(A); 1   maxB:B!A t(B)ggt,
i.e., there exists a real number LA 2 [0;A(A)] such that,
for all  > 0, there exists NA such that, for every t > NA,
jt(A) LAj < , or LA   < t(A) < LA+ . Equation 7
reduces to
t+1(A) =
1
2
t(A) +
1
2
t(A);
We have to distinguish two cases. If t+1(A)  LA;
jt+1(A)  LAj = t+1(A)  LA =
=
1
2
t(A) +
1
2
t(A)  LA <
<
1
2
t(A) +
1
2
(LA + )  LA =
=
1
2
t(A)  1
2
LA + =2 =
=
1
2
(t(A)  LA) + =2 
 1
2
jt(A)  LAj+ =2:
Otherwise, t+1(A) < LA, and
jt+1(A)  LAj = LA   t+1(A) =
= LA   1
2
t(A)  1
2
t(A) <
< LA   1
2
t(A)  1
2
(LA   ) =
=
1
2
LA   1
2
t(A) + =2 =
=
1
2
(LA   t(A)) + =2 
 1
2
jt(A)  LAj+ =2:
Therefore, jt(A) LAj < j0(A) LAj2 t+2 t  2 t+
2 t = 1 + 2.
The proof in the general case where attack cycles may exist
is based on the idea that convergence in cycles may be proved
separately, by assuming that ft(B)gt=0;1;::: converges for
all arguments B attacking any of the arguments in the cycle.
Let arguments A0; A1; : : : ; An 1 form a cycle, i.e., for all
i = 0; : : : ; n  1, Ai ! Ai+1 mod n, and let
u(Ai) = minfA(Ai); 1  max
B:B!Ai
B=2fA0;:::;An 1g
LBg
be the upper bound of the feasible values for (Ai). Note
that a cycle with no external arguments attacking arguments
of the cycle is a special case, whereby u(Ai) = A(Ai) for all
arguments in the cycle.
For every pair of arguments (Ai; Ai+1 mod n), for  to be
a fuzzy reinstatement labeling it should be
(Ai+1 mod n) = minfu(Ai+1 mod n); 1  (Ai)g
and
n 1X
i=0
(Ai)  min
(
n
2
;
n 1X
i=0
u(Ai)
)
:
Now, if t is not yet a solution of Equation 5, there are two
cases:
t t(A) t(B) t(C)
0 1 0.4 0.2
1 0.9 0.2 0.2
2 0.85 0.15 0.2
3 0.825 0.15 0.2
4 0.8125 0.1625 0.2
5 0.8 0.175 #
6 # 0.2
Figure 2: Fuzzy labeling on AF : A! B;B ! C;C ! A.
1. either
Pn 1
i=0 t(Ai) >
n
2 , and there exists at least an
argument Ai such that t(Ai) > 1   t(Ai+1 mod n);
in this case, then,
minfu(Ai); 1  t(Ai+1 mod n)g 
1  t(Ai+1 mod n) < t(Ai)
and t+1(Ai) < t(Ai), whence
n 1X
i=0
t+1(Ai) <
n 1X
i=0
t(Ai);
2. or
Pn 1
i=0 t(Ai) <
n
2 , and there exists at least an argu-
ment Ai such that
t(Ai) < minfu(Ai); 1  t(Ai+1 mod n)g;
but then t+1(Ai) > t(Ai), whence
n 1X
i=0
t+1(Ai) >
n 1X
i=0
t(Ai):
Therefore, t converges for all the arguments in the cycle,
and this concludes the proof.
An example of the calculation of the fuzzy labeling for
an odd cycle with three arguments A, B, and C, such that
A ! B;B ! C;C ! A and A(A) = 1, A(B) = 0:4, and
A(C) = 0:2, is presented in Figure 2.
We may now define the fuzzy labeling of a fuzzy argumen-
tation framework as the limit of ftgt=0;1;:::.
Definition 13 Let hA;!i be a fuzzy argumentation frame-
work. A fuzzy reinstatement labeling for such argumentation
framework is, for all arguments A,
(A) = lim
t!1t(A): (8)
The convergence speed of the labeling algorithm is linear, as
the proof of convergence suggests: in practice, a small num-
ber of iterations is enough to get so close to the limit that the
error is less than the precision with which the membership
degrees are represented in the computer.
Example 2 (Continued) Consider again the dialogue in the
context of a murder. The judge fully trusts the two wit-
nesses but he assigns a lower degree of trustworthiness to the
coroner. The labels of the arguments at the beginning are:
(A) = A(A) = 1, (B) = A(B) = 1, (C) = A(C) = 1,
(D) = A(D) = 0:3. The fuzzy reinstatement labeling
returns the following values: (D) = 0:3, (C) = 0:7,
(B) = 0:3, and (A) = 0:7.
4 Changing one’s mind: rewind
In the proposed framework, belief reinstatement is then guar-
anteed thanks to the integration of the argumentation frame-
work with the belief-change phase. More precisely, when a
new argument arrives, the argumentation framework is up-
dated using the fuzzy labeling algorithm. Therefore, each ar-
gument reinstated by the algorithm will induce the reinstate-
ment, to some extent, of the conclusion of the argument in the
belief set and of all the formulas that logically follow from the
belief set.
The membership function of a fuzzy set describes the more
or less possible and mutually exclusive values of one (or
more) variable(s). Such a function can then be seen as a pos-
sibility distribution [Zadeh, 1978]. If x is the fuzzy set of
possible values of variable x, x is called the possibility dis-
tribution associated to x; x(v) is the possibility degree of x
being equal to v. A possibility distribution for which there
exists a completely possible value (9v0 : (v0) = 1) is said
to be normalized.
Definition 14 (Possibility and Necessity Measures) A possi-
bility distribution  induces a possibility measure and its dual
necessity measure, denoted by  and N respectively. Both
measures apply to a crisp set A and are defined as follows:
(A) = sup
s2A
(s); (9)
N(A) = 1 ( A) = inf
s2 A
f1  (s)g: (10)
As convincingly argued by [Dubois and Prade, 2009], a
belief should be regarded as a necessity degree induced by a
normalized possibility distribution
 : 
! [0; 1]; (11)
which represents a plausibility order of possible states of af-
fairs: (I) is the possibility degree of interpretation I.
Starting from such an insight, a fuzzy reinstatement label-
ing  determines a set of beliefs in a natural way. Given ar-
gument A = h; i, let con(A) denote the conclusion of A,
i.e., con(h; i) = . The possibility distribution  induced
by a fuzzy argumentation framework may be constructed by
letting, for all interpretation I,
(I) = minf1; 1 + max
A:Ij=con(A)
(A)  max
B:I6j=con(B)
(B)g: (12)
The first maximum in the above equation accounts for the
most convincing argument compatible with world I, whereas
the second maximum accounts for the most convincing argu-
ment against world I. A world will be possible to an extent
proportional to the difference between the acceptability of the
most convincing argument supporting it and the acceptability
of the most convincing argument against it. The world will
be considered completely possible if such difference is posi-
tive or null, but it will be considered less and less possible (or
plausible) as such difference grows more and more negative.
Theorem 2 Any  defined as per Equation 12 is normalized.
Proof 2 Either (I) = 1 for all I, and  is trivially nor-
malized, or there exists an interpretation, say I0, such that
(I0) < 1. By Equation 12, then, it must be
max
A:I0j=con(A)
(A) < max
B:I0 6j=con(B)
(B):
But then, let us consider the complementary interpretation
I0, which maps all atoms to a truth value that is the opposite
of the truth value they are mapped to by I0. Clearly, all for-
mulas satisfied by I0 are not satisfied by I0 and vice versa.
Therefore,
(I0) = minf1; 1 + max
B:I6j=con(B)
(B)  max
A:Ij=con(A)
(A)g = 1:
In other words, if a world is not completely plausible, its op-
posite must be completely plausible, and for this reason  is
always normalized.
4.1 Belief Set
The degree to which a given arbitrary formula  2 L is be-
lieved can be calculated from the possibility distribution in-
duced by the fuzzy argumentation framework as
B() = N([]) = 1 max
I6j=
f(I)g: (13)
Such B may be regarded, at the same time, as a fuzzy modal
epistemic operator or as a fuzzy subset of L.
A powerful feature of such an approach based on a possi-
bility distribution is that B() can be computed for any for-
mula , not just for formulas that are the conclusion of some
argument. For instance, ifA is an argument whose conclusion
is p and B is an argument whose conclusion is p  q, and
(A) = (B) = 1, then not only B(p) = B(p  q) = 1,
but also B(q) = 1, B(p ^ q) = 1, etc.
Straightforward consequences of the properties of possibil-
ity and necessity measures are thatB() > 0) B(:) = 0,
this means that if the agent somehow believes  then it cannot
believe : at all;
B(>) = 1; (14)
B(?) = 0; (15)
B( ^  ) = minfB();B( )g; (16)
B( _  )  maxfB();B( )g: (17)
4.2 Changing Beliefs
We can finally investigate the degree of the agent’s belief in
terms of the labeling values of the arguments. Let A, B, A0,
and B0 represent arguments, and let  2 (0; 1] be a degree of
belief. Then, for all  2 L,
B()  
, 8I 6j=  (I)  1  ; (Eq. 13)
, 8I 6j= 
1 + max
A:Ij=con(A)
(A)  max
B:I6j=con(B)
(B)  1  ; (Eq. 12)
, 8I 6j=  max
B:I6j=con(B)
(B)  max
A:Ij=con(A)
(A)  ;
, 8I 6j=  9B0 : I 6j= con(B0);8A : I j= con(A);
(B0)  (A)  :
In words, a necessary and sufficient condition for formula 
to be believed to some extent is that, for all interpretation
I which does not satisfy , there exists an argument whose
consequence is not satisfied by I that is more accepted than
every argument whose consequence is satisfied by I.
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for for-
mula  not to be believed may be stated as follows:
B() = 0
, 9I0 6j= ; 9A0 : I0 j= con(A0);8B : I0 6j= con(B);
(A0)  (B):
Indeed,
B() = 0
, 9I0 6j=  : (I0) = 1;
, 9I0 6j=  :
minf1; 1 + max
A:I0j=con(A)
(A)  max
B:I0 6j=con(B)
(B)g = 1;
, 9I0 6j=  : max
A:I0j=con(A)
(A)  max
B:I0 6j=con(B)
(B):
In this case, a formula  is not (or no more) believed by
the agent iff there exists an interpretation I0 which does not
satisfy  and it is such that there exists an argument whose
consequence is satisfied by I0 and is more accepted than all
the arguments whose consequence is not satisfied by I0.
Therefore, if belief in  is lost due to the arrival of an
argument A which causes the labeling to change so that
B() = 0, a sufficient condition for reinstatement of  is that
another argumentA0 arrives causing the labeling to change so
that B() > 0. However, this does not mean that the previ-
ous labeling must be restored, but that it is enough that, for all
I 6j= , there exists an argument BI whose consequence is
not satisfied by I, such that (BI) > (C), for all arguments
C whose consequence is satisfied by I.
Example 3 (Continued) Suppose the judge finds that Wit1
is little reliable since he was in love with Mary before they
broke up because of John. The starting label of argument B
becomes (B) = A(B) = 0:2. The degree to which con(A)
is believed at the beginning of the dialogue is B(con(A)) =
1. Then the other three arguments are put forward and the
fuzzy reinstatement labeling returns the following values af-
ter 53 iterations: (D) = 0:3, (C) = 0:7, (B) = 0:2,
and (A) = 0:8. The condition for reinstatement of con(A)
is that argument C causes the labeling to change such that
B(con(A)) > 0. At the end, the judge believes in John’s
innocence with a degree given by B(con(A)) = 0:8.
5 Conclusion
An approach to graded reinstatement in belief revision has
been justified and developed. The acceptability of arguments
depends on a fuzzy labeling algorithm based on possibility
theory. An agent will believe the conclusions of the accepted
arguments, as well as their consequences. Arguments rein-
statement induces the reinstatement of the beliefs grounded
on these arguments. Arguments and beliefs are reinstated de-
pending on the trustworthiness of the sources proposing them.
The framework can be further improved following two direc-
tions: (i) specifying the trustworthiness degree by a cognitive
model of trust and, (ii) embedding the proposed framework
into an integrated one where also desires and, afterwards,
goals are taken into account. This is left for future work.
[Rahwan et al., 2010] have recently presented a cognitive
approach to the analysis of the reinstatement notion. Given
a number of psychological experiments, they show that re-
instatement does not yield the full expected recovery of the
attacked argument. Our theory might explain their results by
assuming that the fuzzy reinstatement labeling can assign to
the attacked argument a value which does not yield the full
recovery of its starting value. However, according to our pro-
posal, the new value of the attacked argument may also be
higher than the original, if the source proposing the argument
which reinstates the attacked argument is more trusted than
the source of the attacked argument.
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